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CHAPTER ONE 
Chapter 
 
Introduction 
 
In November 2016, Barack Obama was largely expected to "turn over 
the keys" to Hillary Clinton.   
 
Clinton, the continuity candidate, had run on "a shared prosperity" 
agenda and promised to "build on the Affordable Care Act to cover more 
Americans" and finish "the long fight to provide universal, quality, affordable 
health care to everyone in America".  Clinton also had a plan for helping 
America's poor that included "directing 10 percent of federal investments to 
communities where 20 percent of the population has been living below the 
poverty line for 30 years." (Clinton 2016). However, Clinton was mostly silent 
about "welfare."  
 
Welfare has two meanings in America: it can refer to Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a cash assistance program for single-
parent families; or it can refer to other means-tested programs such as 
housing assistance, health care (Medicaid), nutrition aid, food stamps, i.e. the 
Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and social assistance 
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for people with disabilities, Social Security Income (SSI). In the strictest sense 
of the term, welfare is TANF, a program that served 4.1 million individuals in 
2013, three million of which were children. But welfare is a pejorative term. Its 
association with lazy recipients receiving taxpayer money without giving 
anything in return - the "welfare queen" derided by Ronald Reagan in the late 
1970s and 1980s - is deeply ingrained in the American collective psyche 
(Gustafson 2011). That's why Democrats stay away from welfare: it's 
politically toxic, even though there's not much cash assistance left for single 
parent families in America (less than one million adults are TANF recipients 
today).  
 
President Trump, apparently unaware that financial aid has been 
reduced to next to nothing, has promised to get "millions" off welfare and back 
to work in the address to Congress he gave in February 2017. If, by welfare, 
Trump means food stamps, then it's a considerably larger population than 
TANF:  about 43 million Americans received food stamps in 2016 (USDA 
2017) although caseloads have been steadily declining since 2013.  
 
There are not many politicians willing to take up the mantle of the fight 
against poverty today. There was a sense that Obama himself was, if not 
silent, reticent to talk about it. His former top economic adviser, Jason 
Furman, explains: "I think it would be fair to say that President Obama did 
more for the war on poverty than he talked about. He would talk about tax 
credits for children almost in a middle-class context. But if you look at the 
actual policy the dollars were going to very low-income households ... He did 
Chapter 1 Obama’s Welfare Legacy  
Anne Daguerre 
Page 3 
talk about poverty. I'm not saying he didn't. But he did more than he said he 
did, which is better than the opposite." 
 
In a Georgetown University summit in 2015, the former president 
argued that antipoverty programs did work, and that what was needed were 
much bigger investments in public schools, public universities and early 
childhood education. By saying that social policy was effective at reducing 
poverty, Obama directly contradicted Ronald Reagan, who famously stated in 
a 1988 State of Union address "Some years ago, the Federal Government 
declared war on poverty, and poverty won." Ever the scholar, Obama 
identified three main reasons for lack of progress or even regression on 
poverty and inequality:  
 
• the persistent stigmatization of poor people in American popular 
culture;  
• the cuts in vital public government programs that played a key role in 
redistributing life chances for poor children, the focus of his remarks, 
much more so than poverty among adults;  
• and the advent of class segregation, by which he meant that poor and 
rich people were leading increasingly separate lives.   
 
Obama said: "I mean, there's some communities where I don't know - 
not only do I not know poor people, I don't even know people who have 
trouble paying the bills at the end of the month. I just don't know those people. 
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And so there's a lesser sense of investment in those children." (Obama 
2015a).   
 
Of course, from Obama's perspective these three factors were mutually 
reinforcing. He singled out ideological and partisan opposition to invest more 
in public programs, then cited this as one of the main reasons for rising 
income inequality and declining social mobility in the United States. The 
question is, did the Obama administration address the challenges that the 
president himself had identified? Could the administration have done more for 
the poor? And why does it matter?  
 
Assessing the Obama administration record on welfare policy is 
important. It helps us understand the nature of America's social contract in the 
21st century. Obama projected an idealized version of America's promise of 
economic opportunity through hard work, of a sense of belonging 
transcending racial and class divisions, and of social solidarity enhanced by 
enlightened government intervention. In Obama's narrative, America's 
promise had been broken by a "winner take all" society and a "devil may care" 
attitude among economic and political elites, who ended up guarding their 
privileges in the name of small government.  
 
The search for a more perfect Union resumed after years of social 
regression, when low-income workers had to work more for less. For Obama 
and the Democrats, welfare cheats were the "straw men" that Fox News kept 
interviewing to discredit social programs. This was a calculated attempt to 
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redirect legitimate anger at rising inequality and shift it to those at the bottom 
of the income ladder. Obama did not re-launch the War on Poverty. He left 
welfare alone but spoke eloquently of economic opportunity for all. The 
problem was not so much poverty per se, but that people were stuck and 
could no longer aspire to a better life for their children and grandchildren. In 
October 2016, Obama wrote: "In fact, we've often accepted more inequality 
than many other nations because we are convinced that with hard work, we 
can improve our own station and watch our children do even better. As 
Abraham Lincoln said, 'while we do not propose any war upon capital, we do 
wish to allow the humblest man an equal chance to get rich with everybody 
else.' That's the problem with increased inequality - it diminishes upward 
mobility." (Obama 2016).  
 
Jared Bernstein, Joe Biden's economic adviser between 2009 and 
2011, explained: "I think that whilst nobody was pushing for equality of 
outcomes, we understood that inequality did create barriers to opportunity. 
We don't live in a meritocracy. Obama knew this very well from his own life 
experiences. We realize that there are a lot of people who face barriers to 
upward mobility. Educational barriers, unaccommodating neighborhoods, the 
schools aren't good enough, the jobs for parents aren't good enough, the 
criminal justice system is inequitable. We recognized a lot of barriers to 
opportunity and our job was to bring those down the best we could.”   
 
And then the Obama administration was faced with the 2008/2009 
economic downturn - the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
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The financial crisis wiped out trillions of dollars in wealth – and it destroyed 
jobs and fragile communities. It hit low skilled workers exceptionally hard, 
disproportionally affecting black and Latino workers, who already had higher 
unemployment rates than whites prior to the recession. There were 37 million 
poor people in 2007 (compared to 30 million in 2000), and the numbers rose 
to 46 million in 2010 (Clark 2014). Not only did the national poverty rate rise 
by 3.2 percentage points between 2000 and 2010, there was also a steep 
increase in concentrated poverty. Kneebone and Holmes (2016) write that 
"Between 2005-09 and 2010-14, the share of poor residents living in 
distressed neighborhoods climbed by 4.7 percentage points for Hispanics and 
3.9 percentage points for blacks, compared to a much more modest increase 
of 1.4 percentage points for whites. By 2010-14, Hispanics were more than 
three times as likely as whites to live in extremely poor neighborhoods, and 
blacks were almost five times as likely as whites to live in such 
neighborhoods.  
 
Even as poverty rates started to finally decline, the sense of division 
persisted, accentuated by the surprise victory of Donald Trump in November 
2016. Trump was the anti-Obama as much as he was the anti-Clinton 
candidate. Just as Obama had been the salesman of a more perfect union 
that would conquer its divisions, at times glossing over the gaping inequalities 
and deep poverty that had continued to plague America, Trump presented a 
dark vision of "carnage" and human loss in America's former industrial 
heartlands. Trump was the messenger of those who wanted to close down the 
frontiers of the American welfare state, suddenly presented as overly 
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generous to newcomers and unfairly rewarding immigrants at the expense of 
“native workers.” Trump emphasized that he was talking on behalf of Hispanic 
and black workers and not just the white working class. The enemy of the 
American safety net was no longer Ronald Reagan's "welfare queen", the 
archetypal African-American unwed mother; it was the illegal immigrant.  
 
In truth, since 1996, "qualified immigrants", as the law calls them, must 
wait five years before being eligible for federal assistance benefits. 
Undocumented immigrants cannot receive health care except in cases of 
medical emergency.  So, what Marchevsky and Theohari (2000) have referred 
to as the "radicalization of entitlement", is not new.  But, in the age of the 
"diversity explosion" (Frey 2015), when most children will soon be racial 
minorities, Donald Trump has reactivated a strand of "welfare nativism" that 
sees post 1965 immigration - Asians, Latinos, Africans - as an existential 
threat to the American, essentially white, identity. 
 
For anyone who cared to look, these tensions had been festering for a 
long time, but they took a radical turn with the advent of the Tea Party 
movement, which was propelled by a reactionary backlash against Obama 
policies and politics. Trump has embraced the anti-intellectualist and populist 
spirit of the Tea Party, with a strong anti-expert bias. Moreover, key members 
of the Trump administration, such as Vice President Mike Pence and 
Secretary of State for Health and Human Services Tom Price, have been 
closely associated with the Tea Party. But, as the Trump administration and 
congressional Republicans are starting to understand, rolling back the 
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frontiers of the welfare state is a perilous exercise. There is still a world of 
difference between policies that can be tried and tested in states' "laboratories 
of democracy" and plausible congressional programs subjected to intense 
committee and media scrutiny. Conservative Republicans, safe in the 
knowledge that their radical retrenchment measures would be vetoed by a 
Democrat president, and not interested in the business of making 
"government" work, are bereft of the compromise-oriented technocratic 
expertise that characterized the Obama administration policies, both in style 
and substance.  
 
This book tells the story of the Obama administration's action and 
inactions on antipoverty policies. It's a story of slow progress and incremental 
change through "institutional layering" and “conversion” (Thelen 2003) when 
policymakers build upon existing programs instead of developing new policy 
frameworks.  
 
In a nutshell, the Obama administration tried to expand the frontiers of 
the American welfare state. The objective of social reform - the Recovery Act 
in 2009 and the Affordable Care Act in 2010 - was to broaden the scope and 
coverage of public assistance: means-tested benefits received a generous 
boost while the administration encouraged states to expand program 
outreach. For the Recovery Act, the goal was to increase participation rates 
for all eligible individuals, with a particular emphasis on unemployment 
insurance and food stamp recipients. Benefit take up became a priority; states 
were encouraged to explore all possible options to enroll more needy families.  
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In this respect, what happened in 2009 and 2010 was the exact opposite of 
welfare reform in 1997/1998, when states actively discouraged needy families 
to ask for cash assistance.  
 
In a typical layering effort, Congress expanded access to health care 
coverage to working age adults, who had been previously excluded from 
health insurance: this was the purpose of the Affordable Care Act. Low to 
middle income individuals benefited the most from these reforms, together 
with young people and ethnic minorities. Although there was a strong class 
dimension to both the Affordable Care and the Recovery Acts, the fight 
against economic and social injustice was diluted or blended alongside other 
dimensions, such as gender, sexual orientation, disability, or ethnicity. The 
issue of competition for scarce resources - jobs, services and benefits - 
became once again a hot button issue in the 2016 presidential campaign.  
The "rainbow, young and brown coalition" seemed to receive more attention 
than the traditional, mostly white, blue-collar class.  
 
At times it looked as if the Obama administration, and even more so 
the Clinton campaign, saw the white working class as a vestige of times past. 
As individuals who had to be retrained if they could, regardless of whether or 
not they wanted to adapt to technological change and the globalized 
economy. In his article for The Economist, "The way ahead" (Obama 2016) 
the former president, reflecting on the fear of change that dominated the 
presidential campaign, wrote: "So, we have a choice - retreat into old, closed-
off economies or press forward, acknowledging the inequality that can come 
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with globalization, while committing ourselves to making the global economy 
work better for all people, not just those at the top." 
 
Globalization and technological change were unavoidable and had to 
be embraced; there was no retreat into an idealized past. In Obama's vision, 
the role of his successor - Hillary Clinton - was to build upon the progress that 
had been made and restore the faded American dream of upward social 
mobility through hard work.  
 
The problem is that whilst Silicon Valley was celebrated as the engine 
of innovation and growth under the Obama presidency, the economic and 
cultural decline of blue-collar workers captured by Bruce Springsteen's songs 
grew much worse. As Robert Paxton (2017) has observed, Trump based his 
campaign on the angst of the white working class. Deep America felt 
increasingly left behind and even despised in the 21st century globalized 
economy. There was also a generational and cultural dimension to this social 
resentment, due in no small part to a huge demographic transformation.  
Indeed, the United States is in the midst of a pivotal shift, as new minorities – 
the products of recent immigration waves – contributed to more than three 
quarters of the nation's population in the last decade. Baby boomers grew up 
in a relatively low immigration country, where the white working class was at 
the core of the nation's identity. This world is disappearing fast; today "there's 
a growing distance between a globalized, minority youth and an older 
population who does not feel a personal connection with young adults and 
children who are not 'their' children and grandchildren." (Frey 2015:7).  
Chapter 1 Obama’s Welfare Legacy  
Anne Daguerre 
Page 11 
 
Obama incarnated this new multiracial and multicultural America; the 
President built upon the support of black and Latino voters both in 2008 and 
2012. As the Republican base grew whiter and older, it also became more 
conservative, often animated by a "racism without racists" attitude (Clayton 
and Welch 2016). These voters think that there is no need for affirmative 
action, civil rights enforcement and big government policies. That's why the 
Republican Party is structurally and reflexively opposed to any expansion of 
health and education programs. The Republican base does not like these 
programs because they tend to benefit "others".  They believe they will be 
worse off and condemned to social and cultural extinction if the frontiers of the 
welfare state are allowed to expand and become more racially inclusive. The 
election of Donald Trump represents the continuation of a Jacksonian3 revolt. 
This rebellion started almost as soon as Obama was sworn in office, when the 
Tea Party movement organized several rallies to protest against the 
administration's economic and social policies.  
 
Robert Paxton, a historian and expert on fascism compares the 
systematic opposition against Obama policies to the backlash faced by first 
Socialist and Jewish Prime Minister of France Leon Blum, leader of the left 
wing Popular Front coalition in 1936. Blum led negotiations that secured 
collective bargaining, government control over the Bank of France, a 40-hour 
workweek and two weeks of annual paid vacation. For Paxton, "Barack 
Obama was in some ways an American Leon Blum, elected in euphoria then 
blocked by an inflexible national opposition."(Paxton 2017). Paxton's insightful 
Chapter 1 Obama’s Welfare Legacy  
Anne Daguerre 
Page 12 
comparison reminds us that there was indeed a faction of the electorate that 
never accepted the election of the first black president as legitimate. This 
severely limited the capacity of the Obama administration to set in motion 
comprehensive social policies that would expand the frontiers of the American 
welfare state. But the obstacles faced by Obama were essentially institutional 
in nature, and have been reinforced by the pattern of asymmetric ideological 
polarization that characterizes American politics and society today. 
 
The first institutional constraint was the nature of the American federal 
system, which is qualitatively different from the traditional European norm of a 
unitary state (Beland, Vergniolle de Chantal and Raillard 2014). The doctrine 
of dual sovereignty between the states and the federal government has had a 
long-lasting impact. In essence, the legitimacy of federal government 
intervention has always been contested terrain. Public bureaucracies 
developed relatively late, with the advent of the New Deal, but the United 
States never had the functional equivalent of European civil services (Skocpol 
1996). The fragmentation of policy making is especially acute in welfare 
policy, where not only states share regulatory powers with the federal 
government, but in fact, have been allowed to supersede congressional 
statutes. In the 1990s, a devolution agenda granted more powers to the 
states, especially as federal bureaucracies were gradually hollowed out. This 
trend continued under the presidency of Obama. Several federal law opt-outs 
have developed in the forms of waivers, where states can bypass federal 
statutes to design and run their own programs (Bulman-Pozen and Metzger 
2016). This has resulted in variable-speed federalism, with a strong pattern of 
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state diversity (Conlan and Posner 2016). Moreover, “a la carte federalism" 
creates "geographic inequalities in the treatment of similar claimants and 
exacerbates the weakness of the safety net as a whole" (Bruch, Meyers and 
Gornick 2016:17). 
 
This was particularly clear with the Recovery Act and even more so 
with the Affordable Care Act. Federal government officials had to rely on an 
array of state administrators and private contractors to implement important 
aspects of the legislation, raising issues of accountability, visibility, 
coordination and efficacy. The literature on policy feedbacks indicates that 
that new policies generate, over time, public support from various 
constituencies that enjoy additional benefits, such as expanded health 
coverage. New entitlements become entrenched and institutionalized. 
However, when the public cannot identify who is doing what and for whom, 
popular support for new programs fails to take hold. This is exactly what 
happened with the ACA: public support was muted because so many people 
were utterly confused about how the legislation affected them and their health 
care plans.  
 
The second structural constraint is the doctrine of limited government, 
particularly in economic and social domains. Americans are often skeptical 
and critical of federal government intervention in general, but nevertheless like 
programs such as Medicare and Social Security. Whatever the reasons, 
cultural or otherwise, for this ambivalence towards "the government", it's at 
the heart of the deep political conflicts that have played out during the Obama 
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era. The rejection of welfare remains extremely strong as a result of its 
association with a lack of work ethic and self-reliance that have been 
portrayed as cardinal American virtues. Because the U.S. Constitution 
essentially protects citizens from excessive government intervention, and 
because property rights have been granted traditionally strong legal status, 
advocates of socio-economic rights tend to be marginalized in political 
debates.  
 
Small government supporters therefore, routinely decry a bigger safety 
net as un-American and unconstitutional. The constitutional bias against 
social entitlements represented a real constraint for the Obama 
administration. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has enforced structural 
limits on federal power, enabling states to challenge federal encroachment of 
state prerogatives. With a few exceptions, the Roberts Court has continued to 
issue an "originalist right-of center jurisprudence" in alignment with 
conservative states' endorsement of small government (Somin 2016:443). 
 
The third obstacle to comprehensive social reform has precisely been 
the strength of the ideological opposition to any expansion or even, in some 
cases, maintenance, of existing public government programs. This is related 
to a pattern of asymmetric partisan polarization: essentially, since the 1990s, 
when Newt Gingrich became House Speaker, the Republican Party has 
shifted much more to the right than the Democratic Party. This evolution was 
accentuated by the rise through House Republican leadership ranks of fiscal 
hawks like Eric Cantor, Paul Ryan and Kevin McCarthy. All three wanted to 
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"decrease the size of government to pre-1960s Great Society levels by any 
means necessary" (Mann and Ornstein 2016: 10). In an updated version of 
their 2012 book 'It's Even Worse Than It Looks, How the American Political 
System Collided with The New Politics of Extremism' (with the word "looks" 
replaced by "Was" in the 2016 edition), Mann and Ornstein explain how the 
Republican Party has become engaged in obstructing routine government 
functions, and how structures of separate institutions sharing power have 
resulted in congressional gridlock and obstruction in an era of hyper-partisan 
polarization.  In particular, the Madisonian system of shared powers and 
checks and balances requires that politicians negotiate in good faith, in the 
spirit of compromise and bipartisan consensus (Mann and Ornstein 2016: 
XV). The problem is that the notion of compromise has become an empty 
slogan as each side accuses the other of being unwilling to make 
concessions.   
 
Fourth, the relentless opposition to "big government", an expression 
that is as pejorative as "welfare" in the American political discourse, is not 
simply due to asymmetric partisan polarization, with Republicans living in bold 
red districts and Democrats concentrated in blue urban bubbles (although 
there is some truth to this assertion).  The American public tends to hate 
government but at the same time likes government programs such as Social 
Security and Medicare. As a result, Republicans campaign in the abstract 
against the government, while Democrats campaign on the positives of 
specific government programs. What's happened since the 1970s is that a 
large faction of Republican elites has promoted a deregulatory, anti-tax, 
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union-busting and anti-government agenda (Mayer 2016, Skocpol and Hertel-
Fernandez 2016). Corporate money has flooded to conservative think tanks 
(Cato, American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation are the most 
influential and well-known groups in Washington). Heritage for Action, 
Heritage Foundation's sister organization, was founded to repeal the 
Affordable Care Act, among other conservative goals. Lee Edwards, a fellow 
from Heritage, writes that “the fiscal strength of conservative organizations is 
impressive... The assets of leading center-right foundations are an estimated 
$10 billion, not including the personal wealth of the Koch brothers, 
benefactors of conservative as well as libertarian causes." (Edwards 
2016:33). What is perhaps less well known is that conservative think tanks 
and networks have infiltrated state politics, holding key posts and running 
alternative policies that seek to implement their conservative agenda (Hertel-
Fernandez and Skocpol 2016). That's why the Obama administration turned 
to mayors and cities to implement some of its urban regeneration programs, 
bypassing states' opposition.  
 
To summarize, the Obama administration record on poverty is a story 
of limited success. Put differently, it's between a B and a B minus. On the plus 
side, the Recovery Act and subsequent stimulus packages did prevent the 
advent of a Great Depression. These policies clearly protected lower- and 
middle-income wage earners from falling even further down the income 
ladder. Social assistance benefits were boosted - especially food stamps. 
Unemployment insurance was improved. The administration secured a 
permanent expansion for the Earned Income Tax Credit. Without these 
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efforts, national poverty rates would have skyrocketed: instead, they were 
stabilized. However, progress was painfully slow: it was only in 2015, six 
years after Barack Obama became President of the United States, that 
poverty rates finally declined. In 2015, there were 43.1 million people in 
poverty, 3.5 million less than in 2014 (Proctor et al. 2016). There is no doubt 
that a Republican administration would have let living standards for the poor 
slip much further. Moreover, the administration almost eliminated veteran 
homelessness. The Obama White House made some progress in terms of 
reducing place-based poverty, through the Promise Zones and Promise 
Neighborhoods initiatives (Edelman 2016). Obama's biggest achievement 
was the expansion of health coverage to middle and low-income individuals 
under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Twenty million more people were 
insured in 2015, out of which 11 million gained access through the Medicaid 
expansion. Low income people and children from working class families stood 
to benefit the most from these changes. Obamacare was a substantial 
redistributive piece of legislation, with taxes on upper income earners paying 
for expanded coverage. But Democrats were muted about this social justice 
agenda for fear of being accused of engaging in "class warfare" by their 
opponents.  
 
On the minus side, President Obama did not articulate an explicit 
antipoverty agenda, except in 2015/2016: too little, too late. Overall, the 
administration developed a revamped Third Way approach to social policy. 
Officials relied on competitive grants mechanisms to correct the dysfunctions 
of the market. The emphasis on equality of outcomes through education and 
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early childcare was welcome, but these policies did not develop around a 
coherent, streamlined framework. The administration was a champion of 
gender equality and LGBT rights, but had a comparatively timid stance in 
terms of promoting the statutory rights of welfare recipients. The Affordable 
Care Act left intact a costly private health insurance model. Indeed, Obama 
wanted to ensure that the insurance industry would not de-rail health care 
reform. But major market failures have continued to occur under Obamacare, 
undermining public support for the legislation. Crucially, the Obama White 
House fully endorsed the doctrine of balanced budgets, thus cutting 
discretionary social spending - Head Start and the Community Block Grant - 
of its own accord in 2011. More could have been done to protect these social 
programs. Not all the blame can be laid at the feet of an obstructionist 
Republican Congress.  
 
This said, about two-thirds of Obama's mixed record on poverty is 
attributable to a pattern of constant opposition of a Tea Party dominated 
Republican Congress. The Obama administration made several proposals on 
job plans, increases in the minimum wage, improved infrastructure projects, 
place-based poverty initiatives. All these plans were rejected by the GOP, the 
Party of No. Had the administration been able to implement some of these 
proposals, much more progress would have been made in terms of reducing 
urban and child poverty. Moreover, the administration spent a lot of its political 
capital simply defending and enacting the Affordable Care Act. Considerable 
energy was devoted to just health care reform. As a result, other items - jobs, 
wages, affordable housing - were left behind.  
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The book's main argument is that the Obama administration's attempts 
to expand the frontiers of the American welfare state have been continually 
confronted by a series of institutional and constitutional constraints. The 
presidential capacity to shape legislative outcomes has been severely limited 
in an era of divided government and hyper-partisan politics, which explains 
why state politics and intergovernmental relations have played a much greater 
role in social policy than Congress. This is largely attributable to 
congressional legislative inaction or purely symbolic politics once Democrats 
lost their majority in the mid-term elections in 2010.  It's safe to say that one of 
the biggest impediments to social reform has been largely ideological.  
 
 
# 
Chapter 1: The American social contract at the crossroads, explains 
how the American political and legal tradition is characterized by a lack of 
strong legal protection of socio-economic rights.  The chapter examines the 
legacy of welfare reform, in particular the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
signed by Bill Clinton in August 1996.  This legacy is based on a consensus 
on paid work as a moral duty of citizenship as well as a preference for 
localized service-based social programs as opposed to federal cash 
assistance programs. The chapter shows that this social contract had become 
increasingly flawed as social and racial inequalities widened and as the labor 
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market became increasingly polarized. The Great Recession laid bare the 
holes of the safety net.  
 
Chapter 2: The Obama administration vision: glass half full or half 
empty, seeks to define the Obama administration's vision for American social 
policy. It argues that the Obama administration policies were based on a 
moderate left-leaning modernizing effort through the expansion of existing 
antipoverty programs, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), food 
stamps, Earned Income Tax Credit and unemployment insurance.  The 
Affordable Care Act (2010) was the most significant antipoverty initiative of 
the Obama presidency. The administration was committed to a moderate 
social investment approach centered on expanding educational opportunities 
and generalizing access to health care, especially for low income Americans.  
 
Chapter 3: Navigating the political backlash explores how Obama 
progressive policies prompted a strong political and ideological backlash. It 
explains how the Tea Party accentuated partisan polarization, a trend that 
characterizes American politics since the end of the 1970s. Tea Party 
ideology had three major elements: a hatred of Barack Obama, a visceral 
rejection of redistributive and pro-poor social policies, and a focus on the need 
to cut federal government intervention to the bare minimum. Second, as 
states legislatures shifted to the right, House Republican proposals on welfare 
and food stamps had strong moralizing and criminalizing undertones, with 
some inspiration from socially regressive state experiments (mandatory drug 
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testing for welfare applicants, or requiring that cash assistance cards should 
be banned in strip clubs or casinos).  
 
Chapter 4: The politics of damage limitation, is a case study of 
symbolic politics and Republican obstruction in Congress. Republicans 
accused the Obama administration of wanting to undermine work 
requirements for TANF recipients, a red flag for conservatives. This marked 
the return of the mythical “welfare queen.” The tendency to blame the victim, 
the perception that poor people either do not know how to spend their money 
or, worse, that they would deliberately misuse public funds, that there was a 
need to cut "entitlements" and social spending were popular narratives that 
played a crucial role in the agenda-setting process when Congress started to 
examine proposals for reforms either for food stamps or TANF. Although 
Democrats at times opposed some of the most radical retrenchment 
Republican proposals, they were mostly engaged in a damage limitation 
exercise, with a resulting pattern of system maintenance (as in SNAP) or 
policy drift (as in TANF). It is in this context that welfare litigation has played 
an important role. But welfare court cases do not strike the public imagination, 
thus allowing a hostile anti welfare view to dominate much of the political 
conversation.  
 
Chapter 5: The Obama legacy, assesses the extent to which the 
Obama administration has been able to implement its legislative program. The 
most important achievement has certainly been the Affordable Care Act and 
the expansion of Medicaid. One of the biggest contradictions of the Obama 
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presidency is that it continued expanding the role of the federal government 
whilst at the same time cutting the number of federal government jobs due to 
tight fiscal rules. In fact, the dispersion and fragmentation of policymaking has 
continued, especially in relation to welfare and employment. And, finally, the 
structural social and economic inequalities that have plagued U.S. politics for 
the past three decades, with extreme poverty and in work poverty rising after 
each recession, have been accentuated by the Great Recession and 
persistent wage depression. This has created a huge disconnect that the 
fragmented U.S. polity has been unable to address. 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 6: The American Welfare State in comparative 
perspective, assesses Obama social and welfare policy in a cross-national 
perspective. It argues that the fundamental American social contract remains 
"mean and lean" in comparative terms, despite the real efforts assigned to 
antipoverty policy initiatives, notably the expansion of health care for low 
income individuals under the Affordable Care Act.  European and American 
policymakers have placed a renewed emphasis on equality of opportunities as 
opposed to equality of outcomes, with a blending of some elements of Anglo-
American liberalism and the social-democrat tradition. 
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